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INTRODUCTION: THE BRICK MOON-SCIENCE FICTION
TO MODERN REALITY
N 1869, Edward Everett Hale, in a science fiction story "The
Brick Moon," postulated sending up a brick sphere into orbit
4,000 miles over the Greenwich Meridian to serve as an artificial
star to greatly aid navigators in determining their position at
sea.' Today's reality is far beyond anything conceived twelve de-
cades or even twelve years ago and will likely relegate celestial
navigation, along with a host of modern aids to navigation for
aircraft and ships, obsolete. The enormous capabilities of the
I Edward E. Hale, The Brick Moon, cited in ARTHUR C. CLARK, THE PROMISE OF
SPACE 8-9 (1968) (originally published in the Atlantic Monthly in 1869). His idea
was that a satellite orbiting the Greenwich Meridian could be used by mariners to
determine their longitude, thus necessitating only a single sight for celestial
navigation.
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Global Positioning System (GPS) have brought about this new
reality.
Since the beginning of recorded history, mankind has sought,
with varying degrees of success, to determine where he is in rela-
tion to other persons or things. Happily, it is now possible to
determine instantaneously, continually, and exactly where any
one or anything is, anywhere in the world or its surrounding at-
mosphere, repeatedly and reliably.
This has been made possible through the deployment by the
United States of a constellation of satellites commonly know as
the Global Positioning System.'
During Operation Desert Shield, the world witnessed the first
high visibility demonstration of the GPS system's capabilities.
This satellite navigation system gave U.S. forces precise global
location information that enabled ships and submarines to accu-
rately launch cruise missiles. The system further enabled mili-
tary units in the vast desert to pinpoint and report their
location, thus clearing some of the "fog" of war.
Why is there a commercial interest in the military navigation
system? The reason lies in the many potential civilian and com-
mercial uses of GPS. These many uses include precision naviga-
tion of commercial aircraft, fast and accurate surveying,
navigation and control of ocean vessels, generation of automo-
tive electronic maps, and dynamic routing of automobile traf-
fic.4 "[GPS] technology [is] now poised to leap into virtually
every facet of the American economy [and] is expected to create
a $5 billion to $10 billion industry by the end of this decade and
more than 100,000 jobs."5
At a recent conference, Mr. Richard Arnold, from the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA), framed the need for GPS in very
human terms. Mr. Arnold stated that worldwide, in the last five
years, there have been thirty-nine commercial aircraft accidents
resulting in over 1800 deaths due to "controlled flight into ter-
2 The Global Positioning System: What Can't It Do? Hearing Before the House Sub-
comm. on Technology, Environment and Aviation, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1994)
[hereinafter Technology, Environment and Aviation Subcommittee Hearings] (GPS:
Continental Airlines Position Paper) [hereinafter Continental Position Paper].
3 See generallyJOINT DOD/DOT TASK FORCE REPORT, THE GLOBAL POSITIONING
SYSTEM: MANAGEMENT AND OPERATION OF A DUAL USE SYSTEM 5-6 (Dec. 1993)
[hereinafter JOiNT DOD/DOT REPORT] (describing the use of GPS during Oper-
ation Desert Storm and other military applications).
4 See infra Part II (describing in detail both federal civil and commercial uses of
GPS, both current and future).
5 Ralph Vartabedian, Eye in the Sky, L.A. TIMES, May 1, 1994, at Dl.
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rain [CFIT]."6 Such CFIT crashes occur due to human rather
than mechanical error when the pilot flies her plane into a hill
or other terrain, often due to poor navigation when descending
to land.7 Mr. Arnold went on to explain that many of these acci-
dents could have been avoided if the pilot had better known her
position.'
The GPS system, as developed by the U.S. Department of De-
fense (DOD), can, through the use of relatively inexpensive re-
ceivers onboard aircraft, provide the accurate positioning
information necessary to avoid these kind of disasters. In fact,
President Reagan directed that GPS be made available for inter-
national civil use 9 following the Korean Airlines Flight 007 (KAL
007) incident where the KAL pilot accidentally strayed off
course into Soviet airspace and was shot down. 10
The legal questions surrounding the system are as numerous
as its uses. Who is liable for a system malfunction? What are the
legal implications of the intentional degradation and errors in-
troduced by the DOD for national security reasons? Who
should pay for the ongoing monitoring and maintenance of the
system? What are the implications of foreign governments rely-
ing on a U.S. system?
Jim Landry, President of the Air Transportation Association,
recently put the issue squarely on the table, emphasizing that
the airlines want and need the system now; that these legal/lia-
bility issues should not impede the implementation of civil ap-
plications of GPS; and that the legal community has an
6 Richard Arnold, Statement at The Annual Georgetown Law Center Conference on
the Law and Outer Space, Doing Business in Outer Space: The Role of Satellites in Tele-
communications Policy and Business (Nov. 4, 1994) [hereinafter Space Law Sympo-
sium 1994] (notes taken by the author on Mr. Arnold's remarks and other
symposium materials are on file with the author). A Flight Safety Foundation
task force study recently predicted that CFIT accidents "could be halved if airport
letdown and approach procedures were flown using GPS navigation, rather than
existing non-precision navigation aids. ... " David Learmount, Task Force Plans to
Halve CFIT Incidents .... FLIGHT INT'L, Nov. 9, 1994, available in WESTLAW, PTS-
ADMT Database. The study also noted that "the majority of fatal errors involved
deviation below glideslope [on approach to landing], rather than a lateral naviga-
tion error, with most impacts occurring within 200 ft. (60m) of the terrain top."
Id.
7 Id.
s Arnold, supra note 6.
9 JoiNT DOD/DOT REPORT supra note 3, at 1.
10 Id.
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opportunity to develop a framework in advance of the commer-
cial (civil) use of this system."
This Comment surveys these concerns and attempts to pro-
vide a framework for understanding and addressing the legal
issues that have arisen or are likely to arise as government agen-,
cies and commercial entities begin to rely on GPS and look to it
as the cornerstone of a Global Navigation Satellite System
(GNSS) . 1 2 Part II provides an overview of the GPS system, its
development, and its current and future uses. This background
details not only the magnitude of the benefits that could accrue
through civil use of GPS, but also lays out the crucial role of
various agencies within the government in defining, operating,
and funding this system. Part III examines the issue of U.S. gov-
ernment liability, looking both to domestic statutes and interna-
tional law. Finally, Part IV looks toward the shape of a future
legal regime for an international GNSS, addressing both the lia-
bility aspects and the need for international instead of unilateral
action to facilitate the use of this new technology.
The lessons learned in the internationalization of satellite
communication should not be forgotten here. The United
States, and in particular its legal community, has an opportunity
to lead, not only in providing the technology, but also in struc-
turing a sound legal regime that can gain international
acceptance.
II. OVERVIEW: DEVELOPMENT AND CIVIL USES OF THE
GPS SYSTEM
A fishing vessel is sinking off the New England Coast. As it
sinks below the water an electronic device is automatically re-
leased in response to the increasing water pressure. The elec-
tronic device floats to the surface and starts transmitting a
mayday signal-not S-O-S, but a complex signal containing the
vessel's name and exact location as determined by a tiny GPS
receiver in the electronic device. The signal, received by an over-
head satellite, is transmitted directly to the U.S. Coast Guard.
The Coast Guard dispatches a rescue helicopter, whose onboard
11 Jim Landry, Statement at the Space Law Symposium 1994, supra note 6.
12 As will be discussed later, providing basic positioning information with GPS
is seen as only one component of a GNSS system. A comprehensive system may
include the Russian GLONASS system (similar to GPS), as well as augmentation
and communication systems. See Bruce D. Nordwall, Navsat Users Want Civil Con-
trol, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Oct. 18, 1993, at 57 (discussing the use of a
combined GPS/GLONASS system to meet civil needs).
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GPS receiver allows the pilot to fly to the exact location of the
transmitter. Once on scene (in minutes rather than hours) the
pilot locates and recovers the fisherman from the cold waters of
the North Atlantic, where the difference between life and death
is measured in minutes.13
In this new technology lies the future of air-sea rescue and
scores of other uses, some not yet contemplated. Unveiling the
how and why of GPS's creation will help explain some of the
complex issues with its civil application.
This Part first describes in non-technical terms how GPS func-
tions. It then discusses the movement among U.S. government
agencies to enhance and develop civil uses of GPS. Next this
Part highlights some concerns that other nations have raised
about reliance on the GPS system. Finally it provides a brief sur-
vey of current and future civil applications of GPS, illustrating
that, at present, only a small number of the many potential uses
of GPS technology have been developed.
A. DESCRIPTION AND DEVELOPMENT OF GPS
AS A MnlARy SYSTEM
One of the key difficulties in addressing civil legal issues is
that, although civil uses were contemplated when development
began in the 1970s, GPS was developed as a military system by
the Department of Defense (DOD). 4 Its purpose was to pro-
vide military forces with precise information for navigation,
targeting, and troop coordination, thereby reducing reliance on
land-based navigation systems. 15 Given the extreme usefulness
of GPS navigation to U.S. forces, and the powerful use an oppos-
ing military could make of GPS, the DOD has been understand-
ably reluctant to make the full military GPS system available to
commercial users. As will be described below, the DOD has re-
leased only a degraded GPS system for widespread use.
It is foreseeable that errors induced by such a degraded GPS
may cause accidents. An issue addressed by this Comment is
whether the U.S. government may be held responsible for acci-
dents caused by reliance on this degraded GPS system.
Is While this is a hypothetical, commercial fishing vessels do carry a device
called an EPIRB (Emergency Position Indicator Radio Beacon), which sends a
radio signal that can be triangulated by satellites. EPIRBs that incorporate GPS
receivers are also commercially available.
14 SeeJoiNT DOD/DOT REPORT, supra note 3, at 1 (describing the purposes
and development of the GPS system).
15 Id.
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Unfortunately, in order to understand the legal implications,
one must first understand some of the technical aspects of the
GPS system. The Global Positioning System can best be de-
scribed in three components: the space component, the re-
ceiver/user component, and the control component. The space
component consists of a constellation of twenty-four satellites
orbiting the earth, 6 each with its own atomic clock, broadcast-
ing positioning signals over a broad area as it circles the earth.1 7
The receiver segment consists of GPS receivers and antennas on
ships, planes, or any other platform that receive signals from
multiple GPS satellites and convert these signals into geographic
positions. Although the technical aspects of the system are diffi-
cult to understand, the basic theory is simple. Imagine each
GPS satellite is a foghorn, and each sends out a signal at exactly
the same time. Because sound travels 340 meters per second,
the mariner can time how long it takes for each foghorn signal
to arrive at his location. Knowing how fast sound travels he can
determine how far away he is from each foghorn and knowing
the positions of the foghorns can thus determine his own posi-
tion. In the GPS system, satellites orbiting the earth transmit
radio signals (rather than sound signals) but the concept is the
same.' The geographic position may then be displayed as a dig-
ital readout of latitude and longitude, or in conjunction with a
computer based charting/mapping system may be used to dis-
play the ship's or plane's position on an electronic chart. The
earth-based control segment consists of monitoring and satellite
control facilities run by the DOD. This segment is crucial for
monitoring the "integrity"19 of the system, correcting the posi-
16 These satellites orbit at an altitude of approximately 11,000 miles and thus
are not in geosynchronous orbit, as are many communication satellites.
'7 JOINT DOD/DOT REPORT, supra note 3, at 2.
18 See id. The satellite signal includes a timing component from its atomic
clock. The receiver receives signals from multiple satellites and measures the
time differential between signals received from different satellites and calculates
its position. For an excellent description of how GPS technology works and the
foghorn analogy, see GPS NAVSTAR USER'S OVERVIEW 28 (ARINC Research Co.
5th ed,, 1991) (booklet distributed by the Coast Guard Information Center, Alex-
andria VA) [hereinafter NAVSTAR OVERVIEW].
19 Two technical terms that appear in the debate are "accuracy" and "integ-
rity." For purposes of this Comment "accuracy" is how exact a position the GPS
system can provide (e.g. 100 meter accuracy); "integrity. refers to the checks in
the system that prevent an erroneous position from being sent and the ability of
the system to provide timely warnings to users when the signal should not be
used. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, A TECHNICAL REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF
TRANSPORTATION ON A NATIONAL APPROACH TO AUGMENTED GPS SERVICES. NTIA
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tion of satellites, generating time signals, and procuring and
launching new satellites to replace older satellites.2 °
One of the concerns in developing the GPS system was that
potential enemies not be able to use the precise navigation in-
formation for targeting. As such, the system sends out two dif-
ferent signals and has other features designed to limit its
military use by hostile forces. GPS has a Precise Positioning Ser-
vice (PPS) providing a highly accurate position which, through
the use of encryption, is available only to the U.S. military and
other select users.2 1 A second service, the Standard Positioning
Service (SPS) provides lesser accuracy and can be accessed with
commercially available GPS receivers worldwide. Since Novem-
ber 1991, the DOD has further degraded the SPS signal avail-
able to civilian users through introduction of intentional errors
in the signal called Selected/Availability (SA).2 Although the
DOD guarantees that even with SA on the SPS accuracy is still
within 100 meters, this accuracy and lack of integrity of the sig-
nal is not precise enough for many civil applications. For exam-
ple: "In October, 1992 an upload to a GPS Satellite contained an
ephermeris (orbital data) error of over 2000 meters causing a
horizontal position error in excess of 300 meters for all
standalone GPS users."23
In response to the need to provide accuracies better than that
gained through the SPS or even PPS signal, as well as to provide
a separate integrity monitor, several U.S. government agencies
have developed, or are developing, augmentation systems-the
94-30, App. B-1, B-3 (Dec. 1994) [hereinafter TECHNICAL REPORT ON AUGMENTED
GPS SERVICES] (providing detailed technical definitions of integrity and
accuracy).
20 SeeJoirN DOD/DOT REPORT, supra note 3, at 3. The control segment con-
sists of a Master Control Station at Falcon Air Force Base in Colorado, five moni-
toring stations, and three uplink antennas located around the globe. Id. at 2.
The annual cost of maintaining the system is estimated at $400 million per year,
with all but approximately $30 million of that used for acquisition and launch of
new satellites. Id.
21 JOINT DOD/DOT REPORT, supra note 3, at 4. The PPS signal, which is prob-
ably accurate to within 20 meters or less, has been made available to allied mili-
tary forces, as well as to certain civilian applications through a request process
administered by the U.S. Coast Guard. Id.
22 Id. The SPS signal accuracy is 30 meters, but with Selective Availability (SA)
this signal is degraded to 100 meter accuracy. D.H. Alsip et al., Implementation o]
the U.S. Coast Guard's Differential GPS Navigation Service 1-2 (June 1993) (Paper
distributed by the Coast Guard GPS Information Center).
28 Alsip et al., supra note 22, at 2.
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most prevalent of which is called differential GPS (dGPS). 4 In a
dGPS system, a ground reference station at a known geographic
location receives the GPS (SPS) signal and compares the posi-
tion derived from the SPS signal with the reference station's
known location. The reference station then transmits a correc-
tion on a separate frequency over the local area. DGPS receivers
aboard planes or ships in the transmission area receive this cor-
rection signal and automatically correct their own GPS position
accordingly. Using dGPS the accuracy of the SPS can be im-
proved from one hundred meters to less than five meters. 5 In
an October 1992 error incident, those units with dGPS correc-
tions were given an instantaneous correction by the dGPS
signal. 6
In sum, the military heritage of GPS, with multiple signals and
protections, has complicated its civil use. Further, as will be dis-
cussed in the next section, the need to provide augmented sig-
nals for certain civil uses has led to increased coordination
between various civil agencies and the DOD.
B. CURRENT INTERAGENCY COORDINATION AND U.S.
GOVERNMENT PLANS FOR AUGMENTATION
The U.S. government has seized on GPS as one of the true
"peace dividends" of the cold war. Particularly within the De-
partment of Transportation (DOT), agency officials are re-
sponding to the perceived need for access to an accurate GPS
signal and addressing domestic and international concerns
about GPS. For example, Federal Aviation Administrator, David
Hinson has committed the United States to provide GPS stan-
dard positioning services (SPS) to the international community
for ten years with no user costs.2 7 This statement, recently re-
ceived support from the President of the United States, who, in
24 See infra section II.B. (discussing specific augmentation systems being devel-
oped by the U.S. Coast Guard, FAA, and other agencies).
25 TECHNICAL REPORT ON AUGMENTED GPS SERVICES, supra note 19, at 22. The
existing Coast Guard dGPS system is designed for five meter accuracy, but con-
sistenly provides three meter accuracy. Id.
26 Alsip et al., supra note 22, at 2.
27 Letter from David H. Hinson to the International Civil Aviation Organiza-
tion (Oct. 14, 1994) (on file with author) [hereinafter Hinson Letter to ICAO].
See infra subsection IV.B.1. (discussing the enforceability of this letter as an inter-
national agreement). This written assurance replaced oral assurances given by
former FAA Administrator, James Busey. Hale Montgomery, After GPS, What?,
GPS WORLD, Jan. 1992, at 12.
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a letter to the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
wrote:
Satellite-based positioning and navigation technologies will play
pivotal roles in the global aviation system of the future. This
technology, available today through the U.S. Global Positioning
System (GPS), can serve to improve safety and reduce costs for
operators of all types of aircraft.... The United States remains
committed to provide GPS signals to the international aviation
community and to other peaceful users of radio navigation and
positioning systems.28
This section first addresses interagency coordination as well as
ongoing and planned projects, and second it briefly discusses
international concerns about the future of GPS.
Two agencies within the DOT, the Coast Guard and the FAA,
have taken the lead in facilitating use of GPS and developing
dGPS-based augmentation systems to meet the needs of the civil
maritime and aviation communities. Further, a joint DOD/
DOT task force has been studying the joint military/civilian use
of GPS and has put forward recommendations regarding con-
trol, funding, and augmentation of the original GPS system.
The task force has also made recommendations with respect to
dGPS augmentation systems currently being developed.' A No-
vember 1994 study prepared for the Secretary of Transportation
addressed in detail the specific technical accuracy and integrity
needs of land, air, sea, and non-mobile GPS users.3 "
1. U.S. Coast Guard Initiatives
The Coast Guard, as a military service within a civilian agency
(the DOT), and as the traditional provider of maritime radion-
avigation services,3 1 was perhaps best situated to develop civil ap-
28 Letter from President Clinton to the ICAO (Mar. 16, 1995) (on file with
author) [hereinafter Clinton Letter to ICAO]. This letter was "addressed to dele-
gates from more than 150 nations gathered. . . to determine the global air navi-
gation systems of the future." Press Release: President Clinton Commits to GPS
Worldwide (U.S. Dep't of Transp. Mar. 27, 1995) (on file with author).
29 See generally JOINT DOD/DOT REPORT, supra note 3 (addressing problems
and proposing recommendations concerning dual civilian/military use of GPS).
30 See generally TECHNICAL REPORT ON AUGMENTED GPS SERVCES, supra note 19.
31 The Coast Guard maintains long-range radionavigation systems such as
Omega and Loran-C which provide similar, but less accurate positioning informa-
tion to mariners, as well as local radio-beacons. See generally ELBERT S. MALONEY,
DurroN's NAVIGATION AND PILOTING 434-88 (14th ed. 1985) (describing how ex-
isting marine radionavigation systems, including radio-beacons, Loran-C, Omega,
and Navsat operate and how they are utilized by the mariner).
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plications for GPS. With a mandate under the Federal
Radionavigation Plan and federal statutes32 to provide precise
positioning for harbor approach and harbor navigation,33 the
Coast Guard began placing dGPS beacons along the coastline of
the United States, providing five-meter accuracy. DGPS for har-
bor approach and for coastal and ocean navigation will likely
make redundant existing radionavigation systems, such as Lo-
ran-C, Omega, and radio-beacons.3 4 Other Coast Guard initia-
tives include:35 (1) a Navigation Information Service (NIS), for
distributing information on GPS and other electronic naviga-
tion systems to the public by means of computer bulletin
boards;36 (2) an Automatic Dependent Surveillance System
(ADSS) for tankers navigating Prince William Sound, Alaska,
wherein each tanker will have a dGPS receiver linked to a trans-
mitter, which will update a Coast Guard Vessel Traffic Service
Center as to the exact position of the tanker as it transits this
environmentally sensitive area; (3) a Coast Guard vessel that is
equipped with advanced electronic chart equipment and dGPS
to test computerized chart displays; (4) a Laptop Automatic Aid
Positioning System (LAAPS), that can take positions from dGPS
to position and check buoys; (5) a modified carriage require-
ment, developed soon after GPS was declared Initial Opera-
tional Capability (IOC) in December 1993, to allow vessels to
carry GPS in lieu of other electronic positioning devices;37 and
(6) use of dGPS for search and rescue and icebreaking.
32 See 14 U.S.C. § 81 (1994) (mandating that the Coast Guard implement,
maintain, and operate electronic navigation aids meeting the needs of U.S. mili-
tary and commercial users); 33 U.S.C. § 2734 (Supp. V 1993) (providing, under
the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, that the Secretary of Transportation "acquire, in-
stall, and operate [equipment such as] satellite tracking systems" to increase the
ability to monitor traffic in Prince William Sound).
3 Gene W. Hall, USCG Differential GPS Navigation Service (Feb. 1995) (paper
distributed by the Coast Guard GPS Information Center).
34 TECHNICAL REPORT ON GPS AUGMENTATION, supra note 19, at 22. This sys-
tem will be fully operational by 1996. Due largely to the use of existing radio-
beacon facilities already owned by the U.S. government, the hardware cost for
the 45 dGPS coastal sights was only $1.6 million. Montgomery, supra note 27, at
18.
35 For an overview of U.S. Coast Guard initiatives using dGPS technology, see
Alsip et al., supra note 22, at 2-3.
36 U.S. Coast Guard, 28 RADIONAVIGATION BULL., Fall-Winter 1994.
37 Announcement of Global Positioning System (GPS) Initial Operational Ca-
pability (IOC) and Its Impact on Vessel Carriage Requirement Regulations, 59
Fed. Reg. 13,757 (1994).
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2. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Initiatives
The FAA has approved the use of GPS equipment meeting
certain specifications for supplemental use in flying ocean and
domestic routes and as a supplemental system for terminal and
non-precision approaches."8 To meet accuracy and integrity re-
quirements for use as the primary navigation tool in civil avia-
tion, and for use during precision approaches, the FAA is
planning a two-tiered system. First, a Wide Area Differential
GPS (WADGPS) will use satellites in geosynchronous orbit to
provide a differential signal, which will increase accuracy and
integrity for navigation and non-precision approaches.3 9 Sec-
ond, local integrity beacons located at airports will provide a
higher level of accuracy and integrity for precision approach
and landing.40 Integral to this system would be communication
systems designed to provide positioning data to air traffic con-
trollers for routing, separation of planes, and collision avoid-
ance. 41 An air navigation system based on GPS will make
38 Future Uses of Satellite Technology in Aviation, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Aviation, 103d Cong., 1st. Sess. 34 (1994) [hereinafter Aviation Subcommittee Hear-
ings] (Letter from David R. Hinson, Administrator of the FAA, to Rep. William F.
Clinger, Jr. of the Aviation Subcomm. (Oct. 25, 1993)) [hereinafter Hinson Let-
ter to Congress] (responding to questions posed by the subcommittee).
9 .Id. The FAA is planning to place the space component of this system
aboard four INMARSAT-3 satellites scheduled for launch during 1995, thus re-
ducing costs to $10 million per year for lease of space on the four satellites as
opposed to an estimated $400 million to build and launch four dedicated satel-
lites. Id. at 33. See also Edward H. Phillips, FAA Opens Bidding for Wide-Area GPS,
AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., June 13, 1994, at 34 (providing details on the
-planned implementation of the FAA's wide area GPS system and its operational
capabilities).
40- FAA-stated requirements for Cat III landings are 0.6 meter vertical and 4.1
meter horizontal accuracy with signal availability at 99.999%. TECHNICAL REPORT
ON AUGMENTED GPS SERVICES, supra note 19, at 12. These local integrity beacons
have, however, demonstrated accuracy of 1-2 centimeters. In tests with multiple
antennae on the aircraft, such systems can measure aircraft attitude to one-tenth
of a degree-raising the possibility of completely automated landings using a
dGPS signal. Technology, Environment and Aviation Subcommittee Hearings, supra
note 2, at 15 (statement of Bradford W. Parkinson). See also GPS 'Pseudolites' Offer
Promise for Approaches, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Oct. 18, 1993, at 60 (discuss-
ing technical details and testing of one type of integrity beacon).
41 See Hinson Letter to Congress, supra note 38, at 26. The FAA plans on deac-
tivating long-range surveillance radars, in anticipation of GPS-based Automatic
Dependant Surveillance (ADS) technology, whereby planes will transmit their po-
sition automatically to ground stations. ADS technology is expected to provide
controllers with a comprehensive picture of the location, altitude, speed, and
course of the aircraft. Id. The FAA is also considering an Airport Surface Traffic
Automation (ASTA) system, which would use similar dGPS technology and
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redundant many current air navigation aids such as VOR, DME,
ADF, ILS, and MLS42 with enormous cost savings.
3. Federal Highway Administration (FHwA) Initiatives
As part of an Intelligent Vehicle and Highway System (IVHS)
project designed to improve safety and efficiency, the govern-
ment has committed $659 million over six years to various
projects. 43 Accurate positioning information, such as that pro-
vided by GPS/dGPS, is critical for several of the major projects.
Specifically, these projects include: (1) vehicle-based collision
avoidance systems; (2) systems that optimize bus movements by
allowing managers to track bus positions and that also allow au-
tomated bus/rail stop announcements; (3) Automated Vehicle
Identification/Automated Vehicle Location (AVI/AVL) systems
that allow improved fleet management and tracking of hazard-
ous materials being transported; (4) distress systems that emit a
distress alert with a vehicle's location when an emergency situa-
tion is detected; and (5) onboard navigation and route gui-
dance computers with positioning information provided by
GPS.1 A trial of such a system, having onboard navigation and
route guidance computers, is currently underway in Orlando,
Florida. 45 Each vehicle in this system is equipped with an ad-
vanced traveler information and route guidance system.4
FHwA is also testing an automated system, aboard thirty com-
mercial trucks, that uses a GPS/computer system to calculate
miles driven in each state. The computer system sends this in-
datalinks to provide pilots and ground controllers with an electronic map of the
airport showing the real time locations of all aircraft. James Baumgarnar, GPS/
Data Link to Improve Airport Surface Operations, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., May
16, 1994, at 54.
New Zealand has already awarded a contract for a GPS-based air traffic control
system that will cover most of the South Pacific. This system will use a satellite
datalink to allow New Zealand controllers to monitor and communicate with
planes over this region. With this GPS-based air traffic control system, New Zea-
land expects increased route capacity along with reduced delays and flight times.
CAE to Supply Satellite-Based Oceanic Control System, AVIATION DAILY, Nov. 9, 1994, at
228.
42 Aviation Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 38, at 196 (statement of David W.
Minek).
0 See TECHNICAt. REPORT ON AUGMENTED GPS SERVICES, supra note 19, at 8 (dis-
cussing the six major LVHS program areas).
4 Id.
45 Hale Montgomery, Nonprecision Approaches, GPS in IVHS, and New Federal Pol-
icy, GPS WORLD, Mar. 1993; at 18.
46Id.
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formation to a central receiving station for calculation of fuel
taxes, eliminating paperwork, reducing unreported mileage,
and allowing accurate allocation of taxes to appropriate states.47
4. The Future Expanded Use of a Satellite Navigation System
GPS is like the Internet in that many of its future uses have
not yet been conceived, but the potential uses are numerous.
The following are just a few diverse examples.
In aviation, aside from routing and precision landing uses, future
applications might include: (1) use of a GPS/transmitter system
as an Emergency Locator Transmitter (ELT); (2) use of the time
signal from GPS for standardizing timing between aircraft and
ground controllers; (3) use by airline companies to track aircraft
location to enhance efficiency and expedite rerouting and re-
pairs; and (4) use of GPS aboard aircraft to calculate winds aloft
data and transmit it to ground stations so that other aircraft can
predict air speed/fuel usage in these areas.4"
Orbital Sciences is developing a combined handheld GPS re-
ceiver and satellite communications transmitter that can be
placed on freight or trucks so that shipping and freight compa-
nies can track the exact location of their goods.49 The Volpe
Transportation Center recently tested a similar system for track-
ing containers containing sensitive military payloads.5 °
"Utility crews, for example, climb up the wrong power pole 10%
of the time, a mistake that will be eliminated as poles are indexed
by GPS location."'1
Trimble Navigation, a manufacturer of GPS, posted sales of $150
million. A large portion of Trimble's sales were for GPS-based
surveying devices, which are replacing optical devices. Trimble
recently introduced a floating receiver that can be dropped on
oil spills to track the spread of oil contamination."
Future non-transportation related federal uses include: (1) use
of GPS remote sensors to gather weather data and monitor geo-
47 Id.
48 Continental Position Paper, supra note 2, at 29.
49 See Kathleen Day, Orbital to Buy Positioning Firm, WASH. POST, Nov. 29, 1994,
at C3 (describing Orbital Sciences acquisition of Magellan, a GPS receiver manu-
facturer and its plans to build handheld GPS receivers/communication
transmitters).
50 David Hughes, Patriot Shipment Watched Closely, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH.,
May 16, 1994, at 59.
51 Vartabedian, supra note 5, at D4.
52 Id.
256
CIVIL USE OF GPS
logical shifts or other environmental conditions; (2) use of GPS
aboard aircraft using photography to produce accurate maps;
and (3) use of the very accurate timing signal transmitted by GPS
in synchronizing scientific experiments, for astronomical re-
search, telecommunications, power utilities, and other purposes
that require precise time synchronization.53
Predictions not only for the growth of GPS related technolo-
gies, but also of potential cost savings are staggering. Senator
Exon, then Chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Sub-
committee on Strategic Forces and Nuclear Deterrence, stated
in a speech before the Senate:
I am astonished almost daily at news of some new advance in GPS
navigation technology or its application to civil and commercial
uses. It appears to me that GPS is rapidly becoming a key ele-
ment of the basic infrastructure of the world's economy and
holds the promise for dramatic increases in productivity.54
Current sales of GPS equipment increased 600% between 1989
and 1992 and rapid continued growth in sales of receivers and
related equipment is predicted. 55 In aviation, in addition to in-.
creased safety, cost savings through closer separation of aircraft,
more direct routing of aircraft, fewer diversions due to poor
weather, and removal of need for costly precision landings sys-
tems at airports are enormous. The International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) estimates a five to six billion dollar annual
savings from satellite navigation use in worldwide commercial
aviation.56 The FAA estimates that U.S. airlines will realize ten
billion dollars in savings over the next twenty years from Trans-
Atlantic and Trans-Pacific route flights alone.57
53 TECHNICAL REPORT ON AUGMENTED GPS SERVICE-S, supra note 19, at 13.
54 139 CONG. REc. S5274 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1993) (statement of Sen.Jim Exon,
The Future of the U.S. Global Positioning System), reprinted in GPS WORLD, July
1993, at 44.
5 Finding the Future, ECONOMIST, Nov. 6, 1993, at 115. According to a Califor-
nia consulting firm, sales of GPS hardware rose from $20 million in 1989 to $121
million in 1992 and sales of digital maps based on GPS was estimated at $1.8
billion. Id.
56 Paul B. Larsen, Positioning Satellites: Current Institutional Issues in Space Law
Symposium 1994, supra note 6.
5 Martin T. Pozesky, GPS Implementation for Use by Civil Aviation is on a Fast
Track, ICAOJ., Dec. 1993, at 18. David Hughes provides a good example of how
this cost savings is realized:
Today the North Atlantic [air routes] are revised daily to take ad-
vantage of the best tailwinds heading East and the weakest
headwinds heading West. The best routes are in this corridor, and
aircraft that fly routes outside this organized track system usually
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C. THE JOINT DOD/DOT TASK FORCE AND THE TRANSITION
FROM A MILITARY CONTROLLED GPS TO A CIVIL
INTERNATIONAL GLOBAL NAVIGATION
SATELLITE SYSTEM (GNSS)
As can be seen from the discussion above, various agencies are
moving forward to expand the civil uses of GPS. However, the
DOD and the DOT have only recently proposed a comprehen-
sive architecture for GPS control, funding, and augmentation.
This architecture is designed to meet the needs of civil users in
aviation, maritime, and land transportation. 58 This interagency
coordination is critical for a GPS-based Global Navigation Satel-
operate in less favorable winds. Currently each route is separated
from the next one by about 60 naut. mi., but when GPS tracking
comes in this spacing will be reduced. Thus more aircraft will fly
nearer the most favorable wind and burn less fuel on the crossing.
David Hughes, Air Navigation Due for Dramatic Change, AVIATION WL & SPACE
TECH.;Oct. 31, 1994, at 51.
58 There are at least five existing interagency agreements providing policy
guidance:
Memorandum of Agreement between the Department of Defense
and the Department of Transportation - Civil Use of the Global
Positioning System (Jan. 8, 1993) (defining responsibilities of both
departments and placing a DOT representative on the DOD GPS
Joint Program Office of the Air Force Space Command).
Memorandum of Agreement between the U.S. Coast Guard and
the U.S. Space Command - Distribution of Navstar Global Posi-
tioning System Status Information (Feb. 12, 1992) (providing a
mechanism for the Coast Guard to pass operational status informa-
tion to civil users).
Support Agreement between the U.S. Coast Guard and the U.S.
Space Command - Distribution of Navstar Global Positioning Sys-
tem (GPS) Status Information (July 31, 1992) (defining the format
and timeliness of GPS status information to be made available to
civil users).
Agreement between the Department of Defense and the Federal
Aviation Administration (1992) (establishing the accuracy of the
civil (SPS) signal and precluding changes to this signal without FAA
approval, except in case of national emergency).
Agreement between the DOD and the FAA (1990) (establishing
.policies for civil use of GPS and for promoting acceptance of GPS
as a worldwide satellite navigation capability for international civil
aviation use.").
JOINT DOD/DOT REPORT, supra note 3, at 10 (summarizing these five agree-
ments). See also Aviation Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 38, at 110 (John M.
Beukers, Administrative Procedures and Agreements Governing Global Radionavigation)
[hereinafter Beukers, Global Radionavigation] (providing a list of interagency
agreements on radionavigation).
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lite System (GNSS) 59 to be implemented, not only to meet accu-
racy and integrity needs for national and international civil use,
but also to ensure that the security concerns are addressed.6"
A joint DOD/DOT task force formed in January 1993 ex-
amined seven critical issues concerning civil use of GPS: (1) who
should manage the GPS system; (2) how continued operation of
GPS and augmentation systems should be funded; (3) the accu-
racy of the civil signal; (4) integrity and availability concerns; (5)
regulation of GPS augmentation; (6) international acceptance;
and (7) risk of spoofing or jamming of the GPS signal.6' The
following summarizes the task force's conclusions:
Management. The task force recommended creation of a joint
GPS executive board consisting of the chairpersons from both
the DOD's Positioning/Navigation Executive Committee and a
newly created DOT Positioning/Navigation Executive
Committee.62
Funding. DOD should continue funding the existing GPS sys-
tem, while DOT should fund augmentation systems, and both
DOD/DOT should evaluate means, including fees, for financing
GPS services.6"
Accuracy. Neither the accuracy of the SPS signal, nor the PPS
signal meets the accuracy requirements necessary for certain civil
applications (e.g., precision landing) therefore a technical study
should be completed to determine an optimum plan for dGPS
augmentation. 4
Integrity and Availability. A wide area broadcast is necessary to
meet civil aviation needs.65
59 Although the terms GPS and GNSS are sometimes used synonymously,
GNSS refers to a comprehensive worldwide navigation system that would use GPS
and possibly GLONASS (a Russian Satellite Navigation System similar to GPS) as
well as the augmentation systems.
60 For example, a Spanish defense company is developing a ground attack mis-
sile that may use GPS for targeting. Craig Covault, Spanish Ground Attack Missile
Design Advances, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Nov. 21, 1994, at 103. Unlike ear-
lier navigation systems, GPS may provide the pinpoint accuracy a future adversary
could use to target U.S. forces.
61 JOINT DOD/DOT TAsK FORCE REPORT, supra note 3, at ES-2. Because of the
weakness of the signal provided from the satellite, intentional jamming (deliber-
ate broadcasting of a stronger signal on the same frequency as the GPS broad-
cast) or unintentional interference from a stronger signal on an adjacent
frequency could prevent reception of the GPS signal. Id. at 48. Spoofing refers
to the deliberate transmission of a false signal, which could pass false positioning
data to a receiver and cause it to give inaccurate positioning data. Id.
62 Id. at 20-21.
63 Id. at 26.
64 Id. at 32.
65 Id. at 39.
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Regulation of GPS Augmentation. Government GPS augmenta-
tion should be implemented, but private sector dGPS services
should not presently be used for navigation.6"
International Acceptance. The DOT should consider initiatives
to enhance international acceptance.67
Spoofing and lamming. The task force recommended more
study of this technical issue.'
This document, released in December 1993, is praiseworthy
for its considerations of a range of options including establish-
ment of a public management body like the U.S. Postal Service
and even turnover of the system to an international body like
Intelsat or Inmarsat-an option that the task force ultimately
rejected based primarily on security considerations. 69
Eleven months later, in November 1994, a DOT-sponsored
technical study was released. 70 This study, made in response to a
request by the Joint DOD/DOT task force, first looked at the
technical parameters, accuracy, time to alarm, availability, and
coverage area required for various civil uses-air, land, and sea
transportation, as well as non-transportation uses such as survey-
ing.71 The study confirmed the earlier joint task force finding
that an unaugmented GPS signal could not meet the very pre-
cise needs of some civil applications. 72 The study looked at six
options, involving combinations of possible augmentation archi-
tectures, and made the following recommendations:
The FAA's Wide Area GPS (WAAS) and Local Area GPS
(LAGPS) augmentations should continue to go forward.73
DOT in coordination with the Department of Commerce should
install and maintain a dGPS beacon system with nationwide cov-
erage expanding that coverage already being implemented by
the Coast Guard. 4
Recommendations concerning data-formats, continuance of the
Coast Guard's Navigation Information Center (then called the
GPS Information Center), and recommending further technical
66JOINT DOD/DOT REPORT, supra note 3, at 43-44.
67 Id. at 47.
68 Id. at 48.
69 Id. at 17, 19.
70 TECHNICAL REPORT ON AUGMENTED GPS SERVICES, supra note 19.
71 Id. at 7-16.
72 Id. at 17-18.
73 Id. at 7-16. See supra subsection I.B.2 (describing the FAA's proposed WAAS
and LADGPS systems).
74 TECHNICAL REPORT ON AUGMENTED GPS SERVICES, supra note 19, at 7-16.
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study on the issue of the system's vulnerability to jamming and
spoofing.75
If implemented, the recommended augmentation schemes
would meet virtually all the foreseeable requirements for civil
users in, over, or near U.S. territory.76 Also notable, is that only
for general ocean maritime routes, where the basic SPS signal is
sufficient, does the recommended architecture meet civil user
requirements worldwide. 77 Another issue is whether the exclu-
sion of international participants from the discussion creates a
barrier to international acceptance of the system. Absent some
international accord, a commercial airliner may have to carry
dGPS equipment compatible with U.S. WAAS and LAGPS sys-
tems as well as separate systems, such as Microwave Landing Sys-
tem (MLS) equipment, when entering or landing in foreign
airspace.
In summary, as can be seen from the myriad of uses, GPS
technology is one of the true peace dividends of Cold War re-
search. Civil users in the aviation and maritime industry are ea-
ger to reap the benefits of this system. Recent initiatives by the
Coast Guard and FAA, as well as the recent, comprehensive ar-
chitecture developed by the joint DOD/DOT task force, will sig-
nificantly enhance the civil utility of GPS. But two issues remain
paramount. First, what liabilities does the United States govern-
ment incur in providing this new service to the civil sector and
how can this liability be mitigated? Second, how and when can
GPS or a nationally-oriented satellite system of augmentation be
expanded into a Global Navigation Satellite System that is ac-
cepted worldwide?
75 Id. at 67-68; id. at app. E (giving an in-depth technical analysis of the inher-
ent vulnerability of GPS and dGPS signals to jamming and spoofing); see also
Bruce D. Nordwall, Worm Holes' in GPS Coverage Raise Interference Concerns, AVIA-
TION WK. & SPACE TECHJune 5, 1995, at 32 (discussing FAA tests of GPS coverage
that showed interference with the GPS signal over some areas in the United
States).
76 Two applications that this architecture would not meet are highway collision
avoidance and railroad collision avoidance, because of the high accuracy (1
meter) needed to determine in which lane cars are travelling and on which set of
parallel tracks a train is rolling. TECHNICAL REPORT ON AUGMENTED GPS SERV'-
ICES, supra note 19, at Executive Summary xv.
77 Id. at 11. The FAA's satellite based WAAS would likely provide coverage
over the "contiguous U.S., Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, the Pacific Ocean to Ha-
waii, the Atlantic Ocean off the Coast of the U.S., and much of the Gulf of Mex-
ico." Id. at 35.
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III. ASSESSING LIABILITY ISSUES FOR THE U.S.
GOVERNMENT WITH THE EXPANDED CIVIL USE
OF GPS
Civil aviation and maritime users already depend upon GPS
and are eager for the U.S. government to alter regulations and
implement augmentation plans to expand its use further. How-
ever, whenever the government provides a service upon which
the public relies, whether a lighthouse or air traffic control serv-
ices, it then faces potential liability for the negligent acts of civil
servants. The Coast Guard and the FAA, the two providers of
navigation aids, have faced countless suits and are understanda-
bly cautious about providing a new service without being able to
ensure the integrity of the system. Thus far, the government has
avoided suits based on navigation errors caused by GPS.78
Currently the U.S. government, by only guaranteeing the re-
duced accuracy and integrity of GPS, faces limited exposure to
liability. But even before more precise augmented systems come
online, the U.S. government and the manufacturers of GPS-
based navigation equipment may have to deal with the liability
issues. To explore the liability implications, this Part poses the
following hypothetical:
An airborne medical transport helicopter (air ambulance) carry-
ing a critically-injured patient crashes as it attempts to land on a
hospital heli-pad in poor weather-relying on GPS for its ap-
proach and descent. 79 A check with the Coast Guard's Naviga-
tion Information Center reveals that at the approximate time of
the crash there were a limited number of satellites within the ho-
rizon of the helicopter's receiver. Checking against a dGPS ref-
erence, it appears that the intentional error transmitted near the
time of crash was close to the one-hundred yard maximum,
rather than the much more accurate signal on which the pilot
78 The only federal case raising the issue of GPS accuracy or integrity is Con-
naghan v. Maxus Exploration Co., 1992 WL 535618 at *6 (D. Wyo. Feb. 4, 1992),
aff'd, 5 F.3d 1363 (10th Cir. 1993) (dismissing the accuracy of a survey done
using GPS because GPS "is only an aid in mapping"). Interestingly, a search of
the Westlaw database of federal cases revealed no cases involving older electronic
navigation systems (Loran-C, Transit, Omega) where the accuracy or integrity of
the system was challenged.
79 The FAA has issued special procedures to allow a GPS equipped air ambu-
lance to use the GPS for non-precision approaches to a Chattanooga, Tennessee
hospital. Use of the GPS system has saved an estimated 14 lives relative to the
alternative ground transport procedures that would have otherwise been used in
poor weather conditions. Global Positioning System, WKLY. Bus. AVIATION, Nov. 14,
1994, at 217.
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may have relied on. The pilot, though he knew that use of GPS
for precision approaches was not authorized, had not realized
the ground fog was so bad until he was in his final descent, and
was then faced with the option of aborting and taking his criti-
cally-injured patient to an airport with a precision landing system
or using -his GPS and altimeter for landing.
Looking to the receiver, did it meet FAA standards for GPS
avionics? Was it a cheaper or earlier model capable only of re-
ceiving several satellite signals at once? If the GPS receiver in-
terfaced with other avionics to provide airspeed, altitude, or
heading-was this authorized and did it meet established accu-
racy standards? 0 Finally, if the GPS provided location input to
an electronic air chart or map and how accurate was the map-
how recently had it been updated?
The permutations of such a hypothetical might change if an
FAA-approved augmented GPS signal were used, but this hypo-
thetical illustrates some of the issues that may arise in future
litigation.8 ' This Part first explores potential avenues for liabil-
ity against the U.S. government under the Federal Tort Claims
Act 2 and the Suits in Admiralty Act,8 3 and administrative relief
under the Foreign Claims Act" or Military Claims Act.8 5 Part B
examines how liability may accrue through treaty or other inter-
national law conventions, specifically the 1967 Outer Space
Treaty 6 and the 1972 Convention on International Liability for
Damages Caused by Space Objects. 7 While issues of liability of
manufacturers of satellites or related ground GPS equipment
and of a future, non-governmental bodies that may one day con-
trol GNSS are raised by the above hypothetical, these issues are
80 For example, in the maritime arena, where GPS is currently authorized for
use as the sole electronic navigation device onboard vessels over 1600 gross tons,
operators are not authorized to use GPS to replace gyro-compasses for heading
information, or conventional speed logging devices for speed. Depending on the
algorithm used by the receiver for calculating and averaging speed or heading, it
is unclear how accurately a particular GPS receiver would track a ship (or air-
craft) in a hard turn or other radical maneuver.
81 See also Kevin K. Spradling, GPS and the Law, GPS WORLD, Nov.-Dec. 1990, at
48 (posing a hypothetical involving a tanker using GPS for navigation to discuss
government liability).
82 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680 (1988).
83 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 741-752 (1988).
84 10 U.S.C. § 2734 (1994).
85 Id. § 2733.
86 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Oct.
10, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410 (1967).
87 24 U.S.T. 2391 (1972) [hereinafter Liability Convention].
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not addressed by this Comment. Rather, the Comment focuses
on potential U.S. government liability in the current environ-
ment to illustrate the role that liability has played in slowing the
implementation of civil uses of GPS and also to show how the
resolution of liability concerns will be crucial in gaining interna-
tional acceptance of a GNSS.
A. LIABILITY OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT UNDER
EXISTING STATUTES
While generally sovereign immunity prevents tort claims
against the U.S. government,8 there are several statutes under
which the United States has waived immunity. Unless a claim is
made under one of these statutes, it will likely be dismissed for
want of jurisdiction. Accordingly, these statutes are likely ave-
nues for claims arising from civil use of GPS.
1. Federal Torts Claim Act (FTCA)89
Under the FTCA the government has waived immunity for
claims of money damages where the loss was caused by a negli-
gent or wrongful act or omission of a government employee act-
ing within the scope of his office. 90 Claims must be brought in
federal court, but liability is established under the law for the
jurisdiction where the act occurred.91 However, this waiver is
tempered by sections of the Act limiting liability in three areas.
The first.area where the government does not waive immunity
is where the act involves a "discretionary function" of the gov-
ernment. In a seminal decision, Dahelite v. United States,92 the
Supreme Court held that the cabinet level decision to institute
fertilizer exports and the failure to discover the explosion haz-
ard of shipping fertilizer in a specially-designed vessel were dis-
cretionary functions rather than execution of policy.93 Thus the
United States could not be held liable for tort damages when a
ship carrying fertilizer exploded.
88 SeeALFRED C. AMANJR & WILLIAM T. MAYrON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 14.1, at
525 (1993) (stating that" 'sovereign immunity' . has become a fixture of Amer-
ican law").
89 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680 (1988).
90 Id. § 1346(b).
91 Id.
92 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
93 Id. at 45.
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The courts however, have narrowed the availability of this
"discretionary function" exception 94 by differentiating discre-
tionary from operational functions. For example, in Ingham v.
Eastern Airlines?5 the Second Circuit held that the failure of an
air-traffic controller to provide accurate, current weather fore-
casts was the proximate cause of a crash and was not a discre-
tionary function.96  The court reasoned that while the
establishment of an air traffic control system was a discretionary
act, once the system was established, employees were required to
act in a reasonable manner, and the government was liable for
failure to do so. 97 Clearly analogous, once the U.S. government
provides a GPS signal for a particular purpose, it would be liable
if failure of the signal was the proximate cause of a crash. How-
ever, the decision to establish such a signal, or provide a particu-
lar level of accuracy would probably be characterized as
discretionary.98
A second area where the government does not waive immu-
nity involves claims arising in a foreign country.99 While this
could be construed to limit accidents in foreign airspace, Kevin
Spradling points out that where the claim "arises" is not always
the scene of the accident. Spradling provides the following ex-
ample: A civil GPS user in Norway, who relies on erroneous GPS
data and negligently uploads at the Master Control Station in
the United States, may sue in the United States under the FTCA
even if the injury he suffers actually occurs in Norway.'00 This is
consistent with In re Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974,10 in which
94 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1988) provides that the Act does not apply to claims
"based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a
discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of
the Government; whether or not the discretion involved being abused." Id.
95 373 F.2d 227 (2d Cir.),. cert. denied, 389 U.S. 931 (1967).
96 Id. at 237.
97 Id. at 238.
98 See Kevin K. Spradling, The International Liability Ramifications of the U.S. 'NAV-
STAR Global Positioning System, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-THIRD COLLOQUIUM
ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 93, 95 (1990) (discussing U.S. liability for GPS
under the FTCA). Spradling points out that:
should an individual claim that his injuries would not have oc-
curred had he had PPS information instead of SPS, [his claim
would] still be barred ..... On the other hand if the U.S. negli-
gently degrades the SPS signal-say for exercise purposes and with-
out notice to civil users-such a decision may be- actionable."
Id. at 95.
- 28 U.S.C. 2680(k) (1988).100 Spradling, supra note 98, at 96.
101 In re Paris Air Crash of Mar. 3, 1974, 399 F. Supp. 732 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
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the fact that a plane crash occurred in France did not bar suit in
the United States because the "act" (wrongful approval of a cer-
tificate of inspection) was alleged to have taken place in
California. 1
2
The third exception pertains to injuries suffered as a result of
combat activities of the armed forces during a time of war."0 '
This exception may completely absolve the U.S. government
from liability under the FTCA if it degrades or turns off the SPS
signal in a time of national emergency.
In the hypothetical air ambulance crash, what if the helicop-
ter was using FAA-approved dGPS equipment, but there was evi-
dence that a nearby radio tower may have interfered with
reception of the signal? A claim may exist, but compared to the
broad extent to which the government has been held liable for
air traffic controllers failing to warn of wake turbulence or pro-
vide adequate ground control, the integrity of the GPS signal
may be a more narrow nexus on which to establish causation of
a crash. 10 4
2. Suits in Admiralty Act 05
The Suits in Admiralty Act also waives the sovereign immunity
of the United States for injuries caused on the high seas or navi-
gable waters of the United States. 10 6 In order to bring a suit "in
admiralty" a plaintiff must show admiralty jurisdiction. The cur-
rent Sisson test requires that the accident (I) arose on the high
seas or navigable waters of the United States; (2) posed a poten-
tial threat to maritime commerce; and (3) was substantially re-
lated to traditional maritime activity.'0 7 With few exceptions, 08
Sisson limits the applicability of the statute to ships or other wa-
102 Id.
103 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j) (1988).
104 See generally Seti K. Hamalian, Liability of the United States Government in Cases
of Air Traffic Controller Negligence, 11 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 55 (1986) (detailing
the expansion of liability of the U.S. government under the FTCA for various
aspects of air traffic control).
105 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 741-752 (1988).
106 See McCormick v. United States, 680 F.2d 345 (5th Cir. 1982).
107 Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358 (1990).
108 See Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 268 (1972) (hold-
ing that the in-water crash of an airplane on takeoff did not create admiralty
jurisdiction because there was no "significant relationship to traditional maritime
activity"). However, in dicta the Court noted: "[O]f course, under the Death on
the High Seas Act, a wrongful-death action arising out of an airplane crash on the
high seas beyond a marine league from the shore of a state may clearly be
brought in a federal admiralty court." Id. at 271 n.20.
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tercraft and some overwater flights.1 ° 9 Further, although the
Suits in Admiralty Act does not contain the statutory discretion-
ary exceptions contained in FTCA, courts have construed simi-
lar constraints:
By overwhelming authority, there is no liability on the part of the
United States for failure to embark upon regulatory activity, and
a discretionary function exception applies to suits [in admiralty].
Once the government takes an action, such as marking a reef or
placing a navigation aid, however, it must act reasonably with re-
spect to those who are likely to rely upon it."'
Nevertheless, just as the government has faced suits for a wide
range of issues dealing with air traffic control, it has faced a simi-
lar array with respect to maritime aids to navigation.- For exam-
ple, in Indian Towing Co. v. United States 1 the Supreme Court
held that the government would be liable for an accident caused
by the Coast Guard's negligence in allowing a lighthouse light to
go out and in failing to provide warning that it was not function-
ing. In Universe Tankships, Inc. v. United States,'12 the court held
the government solely liable for the grounding of a vessel be-
cause a buoy in the river was out of position.'13 This was despite
evidence that the ship attempted to navigate in a blinding snow-
storm11 4 and the Coast Guard's stated policy that buoy positions
are approximate and should not be used as the sole means of
fixing a position.
These types of cases have led to stringent procedures within
the Coast Guard for placing and maintaining buoys and other
aids to navigation-and certainly must color the Coast Guard's
desire to provide an added level of integrity to the GPS system
through their dGPS beacons.
109 See, e.g., Miller v. United States, 725 F.2d 1311, 1315 (11th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1984) (holding the crash of a small private jet en route
between the Bahamas and the United States to fall within admiralty jurisdiction
because this trip "has traditionally been accomplished by ship"); McPherson v.
Union Oil Co., 628 F. Supp. 265, 268 (S.D. Tex. 1985) (holding the crash of a
helicopter carrying crew out to an oil rig in the Gulf of Mexico fell within admi-
ralty jurisdiction).
110 THOMASJ. SCHOENBAUM, ADmIRALtr & MARITIME LAw § 19-1, at 598 (1987).
- 350 U.S. 61, 69 (1955); see also Drake Towing Co. v. Meisner Marine Constr.
Co., 765 F.2d 1060, 1066 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding the U.S. government liable
where the Coast Guard negligently failed to ascertain that a channel where con-
struction had occurred was safe before marking the channel with buoys).
112 336 F. Supp. 282 (E.D. Penn. 1972), aff'd, 506 F.2d 1053 (3d Cir. 1974).
"1 Id. at 296.
114 Id. at 291-92.
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3. Foreign Claims Act" -5 & Military Claims Act'16
These two statutes do not waive sovereign immunity per se,
but rather provide an administrative means for individuals to
file claims for damages caused by United States armed forces.
The Foreign Claims Act allows agencies to settle claims by in-
habitants of foreign countries for non-combat damages caused
by members or civilian employees of the U.S. armed services,
whether or not they are acting within the scope of their official
capacity." 7 While the United States has been very liberal in pay-
ing claims, the government has no legal obligation to do so." 8
The Military Claims Act provides similar relief for those U.S. citi-
zens and others that do not fall under the Foreign Claims Act;
however, agencies have typically required that the military mem-
ber causing the injury: (1) was acting in an official capacity, (2)
acted negligently, and (3) that the act was not a discretionary
function. 19
B. LIABILrY OF THE UNrTED STATES
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
Under existing multilateral treaties, there is no direct mecha-
nism by which a nation or party could hold the United States
liable for damage caused by an incorrect signal.
The 1967 Outer Space Treaty12 Articles VI & VII generally
provide that nations are liable for damage caused by objects
placed in space by that government or from non-governmental
agencies.' 2' While applicability of Article VII seems focused on
"1 10 U.S.C. § 2734 (1994).
116 Id. § 2733.
'17 See Spradling, supra note 98, at 96 (detailing filing procedures under the
Foreign Claims Act).
118 Id.
19 Id. at 97 (providing details of claims under the Military Claims Act).
120 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Oct.
10, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410 (1967).
121 Article VI provides:
State Parties to the Treaty shall bear international responsibility for
national activities in outer space.., whether such activities are car-
ried on by governmental agencies or by non-governmental entities
... responsibility for compliance with this Treaty shall be borne
both by the international organization and by the Stated Parties to
the Treaty participating in such organization.
Id. at 2415. Article VII directly addresses liability during space launch:
Each State Party to the Treaty that launches or procures the launch-
ing of an object -into outer space . . . is internationally liable for
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risk of direct physical damage resulting from launch of a space-
craft, Article VI lays important groundwork for binding a future
international corporation like Inmarsat or Intelsat to meet the
responsibilities of the Treaty. The 1972 Convention on Interna-
tional Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (Liability
Convention) 2 2 more specifically sets out liability for those who
place objects in space. The Liability Convention is accordingly a
much more likely avenue for international claims.
This Convention provides: "A launching State shall be abso-
lutely liable to pay compensation for damage caused by its space
object on the surface of the Earth or to aircraft in flight." s1 2  In-
terestingly, the launching state, which is otherwise absolutely lia-
ble, is exonerated to the extent it can show that the damage was
caused by the gross negligence of the claimant, or its natural or
juridical persons. 12 4
While essentially establishing strict liability for the launching
state, neither the convention language, deliberations on the
treaty, or commentators indicate that this convention was meant
to cover anything other than direct physical damage at the
earth's surface caused by a malfunctioning launch vehicle or a
space vehicle/satellite that did not burn up on reentry. The
only claims made to date urider the Liability Convention were
for damages resulting from the 1978 breakup of COSMOS,
which spread radioactive debris over a large area of Northern
Canada.12 5 Congressional documents indicate that the United
States interpreted the Liability Convention to not include "indi-
rect damages" or electronic interference.126 Similarly, Bruce
Hurwitz, in his book covering the Liability Convention, doubts
whether it would apply to economic damages caused by direct
broadcast satellites or use of remote sensing to exploit another
country's natural resources.1 27
damage to another State Party to the Treaty or its natural or juridi-
cal persons by such object or its component parts on the Earth, in
air space or in outer space ....
Id. at 2415.
122 Liability Convention, supra note 87.
123 Id. at art. II, 24 U.S.T. 2392.
124 Id. at art. VI.1, 24 U.S.T. 2394.
125 BRUCE A. HURWITZ, STATE LIABILITY FOR OUTER SPACE ACTIVITIES IN ACCORD-
ANCE WITH THE 1972 CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL LIABILITY FOR DAMAGe_
CAUSED BY SPACE OBJECTS 3-4 (1992).
126 Spradling, supra note 98, at 97.
127 HURWITZ, supra note 125, at 18-19.
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Kevin Spradling, addressing the issue of economic damages,
states:
The U.S. would probably refuse to recognize the validity of a
claim filed against it for damages arising indirectly from incor-
rect GPS data. This would be consistent with the conclusion
reached by Professor Gorove and comport with the U.S. view that
indirect damages were deliberately left out of the recovery
scheme, and are consequently not covered in any way by the
convention. 12
8
Other experts argue that if a plaintiff could show causation, they
could sustain a claim under this Convention. 1 9 Regardless, one
of the key limitations is that claims must be made by State Par-
ties, thus an individual would have to file with his country and
await the diplomatic process for resolution. 30
Although this Part has shown the narrow scope of liability risk
that the United States currently faces because of its operation of
GPS, it does highlight the need for U.S. agencies to ensure that
if they authorize certain uses of GPS they can guarantee the in-
tegrity of the system through augmentation. Kevin Spradling, in
his comprehensive review of U.S. government liability for GPS,
points out some of the liability risk under the current unaug-
mented GPS. He notes that "the U.S. has a duty to warn civil
users of problems with the system that can have an adverse im-
pact on them" and warns of the "current inability to detect and
report in real time certain anomalies for 15 to 20 minutes."'
The United States is also likely to be liable for accidents caused
by omissions or negligent acts by government employees in
maintaining the integrity and accuracy of the GPS system, such
as allowing the SA to degrade accuracy beyond tolerances with-
out adequate warning or the negligent entry of false informa-
tion into the system.1 32
To date, the U.S. government has been miserly in allowing
civil users to rely on GPS, limiting its use solely to a secondary
system for aviation and to open ocean navigation in maritime
128 Spradling, supra note 98, at 98 (citing Stephen Gorove, Some Comments on the
Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, PROCEEDINGS
OF THE SIXTEENTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 254 (1973)).
129 See Paul B. Larsen, Legal Liability for Global Navigation Satellite Systems, PRO-
CEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-SIXTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE-69, 70
(1993) (concurring with Professor Bin Cheng who reaches a similar conclusion
about liability under the Convention).
130 Spradling, supra note 98, at 98.
13, Id. at 100.
132 Id.
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applications. This, in large part, may reflect the hesitancy of
agencies to have air and marine carriers rely on the GPS system
until integrity and accuracy can be assured-even though the
basic unaugmented GPS signal is arguably a better navigation
tool for many purposes than any of the "approved" navigation
systems. If, in fact, government agencies hesitate because of
doubts about the GPS signal, what about a foreign government?
The next Part addresses the roadblocks and issues in moving
from a national navigation system to an international one, such
as foreign governments' doubts and unwillingness to subject
themselves to liability for something they cannot control.
IV. BUILDING THE LEGAL ARCHITECTURE FOR A
WORLDWIDE GLOBAL NAVIGATION SATELLITE
SYSTEM (GNSS)
Advocates of an expanded international GNSS based on GPS
tend to fall into two categories: those who see the short term
safety and cost benefits available today with existing technol-
ogy; 3S and those who want those same benefits, but fear that a
headlong rush to implement a system without the necessary do-
mestic structure and international conventions in place may be
detrimental. For example, John Beukers points out that other
nations may have viewed oral assurances by U.S. government of-
ficials with some skepticism absent formal agreements, espe-
cially ,in light of the United State's past track record. 3 4 He
133 See Landry, supra note 11 (referring to foreign concerns about United
States military control of GPS as "overblown" and pointing out that the Com-
mander in Chief of the U.S. military is a civilian, the President). The Joint DOD/
DOT Task Force in recommended formation of joint executive board control:
Despite excellent DOD/DOT cooperation to date, the civil commu-
nity continues to perceive GPS as a predominantly military system
and lacks confidence in the ability of the current GPS management
structure to satisfy evolving civil needs. Some representatives of
civil organizations such as the ICAO, the International Maritime
Organization (IMO), the Air Transport Association, The Airplane
Owners and Pilots Association, and GPS manufacturers, have for-
mally expressed concerns that the DOT has no substantive role in
major decisions on tailoring the basic system to meet evolving civil
needs.
JOINT DOD/DOT TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note' 3, at 13.
134 Aviation Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 38, at 99 (statement of John M.
Beukers); The FAA subsequently provided written assurances to ICAO. Hinson
Letter to ICAO, supra note 25. In addition, the President has gone on record in
support of providing GPS for civil aviation use. Clinton Letter to ICAO, supra
note 28. The binding effect of these written and oral statements on the United
States is discussed in subsection III.B.1.
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points out that it was the United States that pushed ICAO to
adopt the Microwave Landing System (MLS) but that even
before implementation of MLS, the United States abandoned it
in favor of GPS-based systems.13 5 Likewise, the FAA supported
LORAN-C for general aviation use and non-precision ap-
proaches, but now with more than 120,000 aircraft using Loran-
C, the FAA is apparently abandoning this system in favor of
GPS. 136
Though the 1993Joint DOD/DOT Task Force recommended
only a first substantive step-Joint military/civil control. The
task force also considered what may be viable long-range alter-
natives', particularly establishment of a private sector organiza-
tion, like Comsat, or an international body, such as Intelsat, to
maintain a Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) for inter-
national civil use. 13 7 This Part examines how previous U.S. ra-
dionavigation systems and satellite communication systems
gained international acceptance, and then provides recommen-
dations about specific legal aspects of a future GNSS.
A. INTERNATIONAL ACCEPTANCE OF PREVIOUS
RADIONAVIGATION SYSTEMS
Omega and Loran-C are two land-based radionavigation sys-
tems, that, while providing lesser accuracy and thus lesser utility
than GPS, are exemplary of the process for international accept-
ance. Omega, a worldwide radionavigation system with consid-
erably less accuracy (four nautical miles)138 than GPS, but also
developed by the DOD (the Navy), took twelve years to move
from a purely military system to a civilian (U.S. Coast Guard
controlled) system for civil users worldwide.1 3 9 This process in-
volved numerous bilateral and regional agreements, with the
135 Id. See also PhilipJ. Klass, FAA Cancels MLS in Favor of GPS, AVIATION WK. &
SPACE TECH., June 13, 1994, at 33 (describing the impact of this cancellation on
Canada's and Great Britain's plans to install MLS at airports).
136 Aviation Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 38, at 100 (statement of John M.
Beukers).
137 JOINT DOD/DOT TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 3, at 18-19.
138 U.S. COAST GUARD, OMEGA FACrS & FIGURES (1994).
139 Beukers, Global Radionavigation, supra note 58, at 107. The United States
has signed bilateral agreements or memoranda of understanding concerning use
or establishment of Omega systems with Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile,
Egypt, Francei Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, Liberia, New Zealand, Nor-
way, and South Africa. 2 IGOR I. KAvAss, A GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES TREATIES
IN FORCE 391-93 (ed. 1994).
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U.S. government retaining complete control.140  Loran-C,
though lacking worldwide coverage, provides improved accuracy
(up to 500 yard accuracy depending on proximity of Loran-C
stations).14' Its evolution from a military to international system
has a thirty year history (1964-1994) of bilateral and regional
international agreements, and only in the last few years has the
U.S. Coast Guard turned over physical control of certain Loran-
C stations overseas to other nations. 42 In comparing GPS to
these systems, John Beukers points out that "[t] echnological ad-
vance and operational requirements [will] more than likely take
[a] back seat" to issues of funding.143 He notes that these agree-
ments obligated other nations to little or no cost, which was a
significant factor in their acceptance of the systems. Both
Omega and Loran-C were operational long before they became
fully accepted by the air and maritime communities.
International acceptance of GPS in many ways appears to be
following a three phase path similar to that followed by these
previous systems:
Phase One: development for military use;
Phase Two: turnover to civil control and growing bilateral/multi-
lateral agreements with other nations; and
Phase Three: international agreements and, in the case of Loran-
C, joint control.
According to this model, GPS is leaving phase one and
moving into phase two-with joint military/civilian control and
implementation of limited civil use. After the United States
implements its own national augmentation plan (perhaps with
bilateral agreements with Mexico and Canada, who will likely be
able to take advantage of some of the augmentation provided by
the FAA's Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS)), one could
envision a series of bilateral or regional agreements for
countries or regions such as the EEC to set up their own
augmentation systems.
While this approach may lead in the short term to a more
rapid integration of GPS technology into the U.S. transportation
sector and other civil uses, it essentially would require continued
funding and control of the GPS satellite constellation by the
United States and leave foreign nations with virtually no control
40 Beukers, Global Radionavigation, supra note 58, at 107.
141 U.S. COAsT GUARD, supra note 138.
142 Beukers, Global Radionavigation, supra note 58, at 107.
143 Id.
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over critical aspects of navigation in their airspace and waters.
In addition, recent action by the ICAO, the European Union
transport ministers, and foreign transportation experts indicates
that this option may be unacceptable for other countries.",
Perhaps the model of Intelsat or other international treaties
may provide a better guide for developing a truly global
navigation satellite system.
B. CREATING A GLOBAL NAVIGATION SATELLITE SYSTEM
1. The Hinson Letter: A First Step Toward Creating a GNSS
In October 1994 David Hinson, director of the FAA, sent a
letter to the president of the ICAO reiterating an oral offer by
the United States to provide the GPS SPS signal to the world
community at no charge for ten years. ' 45 This was followed sev-
eral months later by a letter from President Clinton lending sup-
port in broad terms: "The United States looks forward to the
growing use of GPS and to its incorporation in an integrated
global navigation satellite system. The United States remains
committed to provide GPS signals to the international civil avia-
tion community and to other peaceful users of radio navigation
and positioning systems."' 46 By using letters in lieu of a formal
agreement, 47 the FAA and the administration may be walking a
fine line between demonstrating a firm commitment by the
144 See ICAO Panel's Precision Guidance Draft Mirrors Europe's Pro-ILS Position,
AVATION EUR., Oct. 20, 1994, at 2 (supporting continued use of ILS/MLS systems
until an international GNSS system is developed instead of reliance on a U.S.
GPS-based system); Transport Ministers Back European GNSS But Will Stay in Step
With ICAO, AviATION EUR., Nov. 17, 1994, at 2 (discussing plans for a European
Navigation Satellite System taking into account ICAO concerns to avoid creating
a duplicative system). Walter Blanchard, president of the U.K. Royal Institute of
Navigation stated: "Today, countries control and accept liability for the radio
navigation systems that aircraft use in their airspace ... which nation would
assume financial responsibility if an aircraft accident occurred in a country that
had no control over a stand-alone satellite navigation system and the satellite
performance were implicated." Nordwall, supra note 12, at 57 (paraphrasing
statements made by Walter Blanchard).
145 Hinson Letter to ICAO, supra.note 27.
'46 Clinton Letter to ICAO, supra note 28.
147 Hinson's letter stated:
I would be grateful if you could confirm that the International Civil
Aviation Organization is satisfied with the foregoing, which I sub-
mit in lieu of an agreement In that event this letter and your reply will
comprise mutual understandings regarding the Global Positioning
System between the Government of the United States of America
and the International Civil Aviation Organization.
274
CIVIL USE OF GPS
United States and executing a formal executive agreement that
might have domestic political consequences. Unfortunately, the
question regarding whether these documents represent a unilat-
eral policy statement or an international agreement seems to
rest on whether or not the parties intend it to be legally binding
or not.
148
Under international law, four factors are generally considered
when deciding whether an international agreement is binding:
(1) the parties intend the agreement to be legally binding and
the agreement is subject to international law;
(2) the agreement deals with significant matters;
(3) the agreement clearly and specifically describes the legal ob-
ligations of the parties;
(4) the form indicates an intention to conclude a treaty,
although the substance of the agreement rather than the form is
the governing factor. 149
Facially, the exchange of letters seems to fail on these factors.
While clearly dealing with significant matters, it does not de-
scribe legal obligations in detail. In form the letters are clearly
not a "treaty" and most important, if intended to be legally bind-
ing, proper United States procedures for entering executive
agreements would have to be followed. This would involve fol-
lowing the procedures for review by the State Department and
the Case-Zablocki Act as set forth in State Department Circular
175.150 Further, where, as in the case of GPS, the agreement
obligates funds outside the agency entering into the agreement,
Hinson Letter to ICAO, supra note 27 (emphasis added). The ICAO in Decem-
ber of 1994 accepted this offer. Letter from Philippe Rochat, Secretary General
International Civil Aviation Organization, to the ICAO (Dec. 13, 1994).
148 Treaties and Other International Agreements: The Role of the United States Senate, A
Study Prepared for the Comm. on Foreign Relations, United States Senate xvi, 103d Cong.,
1st Sess. (Nov. 1993) [hereinafter Senate Study]. The study points out that:
International law makes no distinction between treaties and execu-
tive agreements. Executive agreements, especially if significant
enough to be reported to Congress under the Case-Zablocki Act,
are to all intents and purposes binding treaties under international
law. On the other hand many international undertakings and for-
eign policy statements, such as unilateral statements of intent...
are not intended to be legally binding and are not considered
treaties.
Id. at xvi.
149 Id. at xv-xvi.
150 See Department of State Circular 175 Procedures on Treaties, in Senate Study, supra
note 148, app. 4 at 301-17 (setting forth the procedures for entering into treaties
and executive agreements).
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consultation with the Office of Management and Budget is
required. 151
The only counterargument would be that this action is a mi-
nor agreement pursuant to the duties of the United States as a
member of the International Civil Aviation Organization under
the Chicago Convention. However, though Congress has pro-
vided that "[t]he Secretary of Transportation is empowered and
directed to encourage and foster the development of civil aero-
nautics and air commerce in the United States and abroad""
and to "acquire, establish, and improve air-navigation facilities
wherever necessary,"' 5 3 this delegation does not circumvent es-
tablished procedures for entering into binding executive agree-
ments. This exchange of letters would likely be characterized as
a non-binding international agreement. A recent study by the
Congressional Research Service prepared for the U.S. Senate
Foreign Relations Committee states that these non-binding
agreements,
[s]ometimes called political agreements... are not considered
treaties under international law. They are not enforceable in
courts, and rules concerning compliance, modification, and with-
drawal from treaties do not apply. Nevertheless, these agree-
ments may be considered morally and politically binding by the
parties, and the President may be making a type of national com-
mitment when he enters one. Moreover, such agreements are occa-
sionally later converted into legally binding executive agreements.'54
Thus, even though with regard to United States law this ex-
change is probably not legally binding, it represents a sound pol-
icy decision appropriate at this stage and can be followed with a
formal agreement when the parameters of GNSS are more fully
developed.
While under U.S. law this exchange appears non-binding,
under international law through unilateral acts "[a] state may
bind itself by other clear one-sided statements to a certain be-
' State Department regulations provide:
If a proposed agreement embodies a commitment to furnish funds,
good, or services that are beyond or in addition to those authorized
in an approved budget, the agency proposing the agreement shall
state what arrangements have been planned or carried out con-
cerning consultation with the Office of Management and Budget
for such commitment.
22 CFR § 181.4(e) (1995).
152 49 U.S.C. app. § 1346 (1988).
153 Id. app. § 1348(b)(1).
154 Senate Study, supra note 148, at xxxvii-xxxviii (emphasis added).
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havior."155 For example, the International Court ofJustice held
that statements made by France that it would cease nuclear test-
ing in the Pacific had legally binding consequences.'m How-
ever, under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
Article 46:
A State may not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound by a
treaty has been expressed in violation of a provision of its inter-
nal law regarding competence to conclude treaties as invalidat-
ing its consent unless that violation was manifest and concerned
a rule of its internal law of fundamental importance.157
This does not answer the question of whether the Hinson letter,
though not following proper internal procedures for executive
agreements, would be valid; rather it raises the question of what
constitutes "fundamental importance."
The Hinson letter to ICAO thus represents, if not an enforce-
able international agreement, a strong commitment on the part
of the United States to play a major role in developing a GNSS
by providing the basic navigation signal necessary for such a sys-.
tem to function.
2. Intelsat/inmarsat: Would an International Organization Work
for GNSS?
There are many who recommend that an international organ-
ization be formed, like Intelsat or Inmarsat, to control GPS/
GNSS. 158 While this may be the best long-term solution, neither
Intelsat or Inmarsat originated from dedicated military applica-
tions and neither were developed overnight.
The Intelsat Agreement, which entered into force in 1973,159
was the culmination of a decade of negotiations and multilateral
agreements following the Communications Satellite Act of
155 INGRID DETTER, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 192 (1994).
156 Id. at 193 (discussing Nuclear Tests, ICJ Reports 253 (1974)).
157 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, in Senate Study, supra note 147,
app. 5, art. 8, at 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention], (emphasis added). The
United States has not ratified the Convention in part because of this provision.
See id. at xxxiii-xxxiv.
158 See Nordwall, supra note 12, at 57 (discussing proposals for an international
organization); Montgomery, supra note 27, at 12 (discussing proposals for a fu-
ture system modeled after Inmarsat). Cf Larsen, supra note 56 (proposing that
the United Nations Committee for the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UN-
COPUOS) should establish guidance principles for development of GNSS).
159 Agreement Relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Or-
ganization, Aug. 20, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 3813 (entered into force Feb. 12, 1973)
[hereinafter Intelsat Agreement].
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1962.160 The result of President Kennedy's 1961 offer of United
States leadership in providing satellite communications to the
world 161 was an act creating COMSAT, a heavily regulated U.S.
corporation. COMSAT provided a U.S. institution on which to
model the international organization, and which largely con-
trolled Intelsat until 1979.162 Inmarsat, an international agency
modeled after Intelsat, was created at the behest of the Interna-
tional Maritime Organization to provide critical communication
and search-and-rescue capabilities at sea. 163
Could such an organization be established for GNSS? As a
preliminary matter, one would have to separate GPS control
from control of a GNSS because U.S. security interests will al-
most certainly preclude the total relinquishment of control of
the current GPS satellite constellation system to an international
or private body. Not only is there a continuing need for U.S.
forces to have a secure means of positioning, but these satellites
probably have capabilities beyond those touted to the open
press. A useful distinction can be drawn with civil, commercial
satellite communication systems like Inmarsat, and Intelsat,
which though probably derived from U.S. military satellite com-
munications technology, never replaced military systems. The
DOD retains its own secure military satellite communications
capability.
While in theory a GNSS organization could procure and
launch its own satellite system, up-front funding of such a ven-
ture is unlikely. However, if such an organization reached a for-
mal agreement with the United States guaranteeing the GPS
signal for ten years, as discussed in the previous section, it could
move ahead with developing a global system. Such organiza-
tiot, with a structure similar to Intelsat might function as
follows:
Basic Signal
The basic signal would be provided by United States controlled
GPS until 2005 with gradual phase in of GNSS space components
placed aboard dedicated navigation satellites or as payload
aboard communication or other- satellites.
160 Communications Satellite Act of 1962, 47 U.S.C. § 701 (1988).
161 Bert W. Rein & Carl R. Frank, The Legal Commitment of the United States to the
INTELSAT System, 14 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COMM. REG. 219, 219 (1989).
162 See Alexandra M. Field, Moving Forward Into A New Century: INTELSAT at a
Crossroads, 25 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1335 (1994) (providing an overview of the
development of INTELSAT).
163 See id. at 1343-44 (discussing the creation of Inmarsat).
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Augmentation
Augmentation could be provided in the short term using dGPS
transmitters aboard communication or other satellites similar to
the WAAS system being deployed by the FAA. LADPGS for preci-
sion landing at airports would be operated and funded by the
national aviation authorities, within each state, although the
technical aspects of such systems would be standardized through
ICAO.
Sources of Funding
While limited seed money may need to be provided by member
nations, funding could be provided through various means.
(1) Fee Sharing Arrangements with Communications Corporations.
Since air-traffic control/remote tracking and many other GNSS
applications will require datalink communication of object posi-
tion, typically using existing satellite communication links, the
GNSS organization could offer to share fees with the lowest bid-
der among competing providers of satellite communications.
(2) Licensing Fees. Currently, in the United States the FCC re-
quires operators of certain electronics, radar, radios (capable of
transmission on certain frequencies), and other equipment to
pay licensing fees, which essentially serve only to generate reve-
nue. A percentage of such a license fee charged to the operator
of either the receiver or the transmitter could be designated for
the GNSS organization.
(3) Joint Funding by Party States. Party States could collect reve-
nues from domestic users in any number of fashions. There is
some precedence to this with earlier Air Navigation Services over
the North Atlantic.164
3. An International Convention on GNSS Could Borrow from Past
Conventions
a. Using Existing Expertise and Models from the United
Nations
The United Nations Committee for the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space (UNCOPUOS), which drafted not only the 1967
Outer Space Convention, but more recently a resolution provid-
ing guidance for remote sensing satellites, could provide the
164 See Gerald F. Fitzgerald, Q.C., ICAO and the Joint Financing of Certain Air
Navigation Services, 11 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 17 (1986) (the second part to this
Article was published in 12 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 33 (1987)). Fitzgerald notes
that in 1986 ICAO and its predecessor had participated in joint financing, instal-
lation, and maintenance of air navigation services in the North Atlantic for 40
years under the Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 15
U.N.T.S. 295.
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broad consensus necessary for an international system.1 6 5 Pro-
fessor Larsen, in emphasizing the need for U.N. participation in
creating a truly international GNSS, notes: "[N]one of the do-
mestic [U.S.] institutions are competent to look at all GPS uses
and all needs. Only one international institution has a mandate
broad enough to encompass all GPS uses. That is the United
Nations Committee for the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space."1 ff
Professor Larsen applies the broad guidance provided by UN-
COPUOS in the context of remote sensing to the establishment
of a GPS based GNSS. Some of the key principles set out by
Professor Larsen are: ensuring availability of positioning data on
a nondiscriminatory basis at a reasonable cost, resolution of dis-
putes through established procedures, and international re-
sponsibility for the positioning of satellites.1 67 A resolution by
the U.N. providing general guidance facilitate creation of a truly
global international system by laying the foundation upon which
an international organization or corporation can be
constructed.
165 See Larsen, supra note 56 (discussing the role of UNCOPUOS).
166 Id.
167 The fifteen guidance principles forwarded by Professor Larsen are:
1. The extent to which the operator of positioning satellites
should be permitted to process data received by the positioning
system.
2. Access to positioning satellite systems.
3. Application of international law to positioning satellite systems.
4. Prohibition on discrimination regarding availability of informa-
tion based on a country's stage of economic or scientific
development.
5. International cooperation.
6. Adequate storage of information for later use.
7. Technical assistance to other interested States on mutually
agreed terms.
8. Technical assistance by the relevant specialized institutions,
such as ICAO and IMO.
9. Distribution of information regarding unusual events involving
positioning satellites.
10. Protection of the earth's environment.
11. Warning of approaching disasters.
12. Availability of positioning information on a non-discriminatory
basis and on reasonable cost terms.
13. Consultations upon request.
14. International responsibility for the activities of positioning
satellites.
15. Resolution of disputes through established procedures for the
peaceful settlement of disputes.
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b. Dealing with Liability Issues for GNSS
As discussed in Part II, liability of the United States or a pri-
vate entity operating the GNSS system can be reduced as a con-
cern once accuracy and integrity concerns are met through use
of augmentation. But without a convention dealing with liabil-
ity, many nations' sovereign immunity laws would bar tort ac-
tions for negligence by government employees. 16 In the United
States, plaintiffs may be barred from claims against other gov-
ernments by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976
(FSIA),169 which generally bars suits against other sovereign na-
tions unless the claim falls within a prescribed exception.170
This Act largely reflects the international law doctrine of restric-
tive immunity of sovereigns for public acts.1 71 Any international
agreement reached will face a host of practical issues such as:
1. Waiver of sovereign immunity. For example the Convention on
International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (Lia-
bility Convention) provides recovery primarily through diplo-
matic channels. Thus a foreign plaintiff's ability to recover from
another nation is de facto limited by national policy considera-
tions and the inevitable bureaucratic delay.172
2. Jurisdictional issues for private party defendants. For example,
should Hughes, the builder of a GPS satellite, or Magellan, the
builder of a particular GPS receiver, be subject to suit in a for-
eign nation? Certainly it would be foreseeable that the service
would be used worldwide.
168 Hamalian, supra note 104, at 55.
169 28 U.S.C. § 1330 (1988).
170 The five exceptions are:
1. Where the sovereign has waived immunity, as the United States
has under the FTCA and Suits in Admiralty Act.
2. The action is result of commercial activity in the United States
or has a direct effect in the United States.
3. Claims concerning property taken in violation of international
law.
4. Claims concerning immovable property located in the United
States, or
5. Certain tort claims.
SCHOENBAUM, supra note 110, § 19-3 at 601.
171 See Charles N. Brower et al., The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 in
Pracice, 73 AM.J. INT'L L. 200 (1979) (discussing the FSIA and detailing the doc-
trine of restrictive immunity).
172 Article XI does not prevent an individual of one country from pursuing a
claim in another State's courts. Thus a foreign citizen would likely be able to
bring a claim against the United States under the FTCA or Suits in Admiralty Act.
Liability Convention, supra note 87, at 2397.
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3. Strict liability or negligence. The Liability Convention imposes
absolute liability for damage caused by space objects. However,
where there is a GPS signal degradation, for example, should
strict liability be imposed, or should a negligence standard be
adopted? What if a problem with the GPS signal was only a con-
tributing factor?
4. Alternative dispute resolution-liability of international organiza-
tions. If an international organization is formed, its liability and
contribution by signatory States will have to be addressed and will
likely be patterned after those provisions in the Liability Conven-
tion and Intelsat Treaty providing for dispute resolution through
arbitration or other mechanisms. 173
As a future GNSS takes shape, liability concerns will need to
be addressed to provide assurances to States about the scope of
their potential liability. Addressing these concerns will also en-
courage GPS-related technological advances because the parties
working on such advances will not be faced with chilling liability
concerns. Nonetheless, any legal system that is developed must
provide an adequate means for injured parties to claim redress.
c. Setting International Technical Standards For GPS/dGPS
Receivers and Related Avionics/Electronics
Both the Coast Guard and the FAA have considerable experi-
ence working through international bodies to develop standards
for electronic equipment and avionics. In fact, ICAO has begun
to work seriously with technical GPS issues, establishing stan-
dards on flight navigation, communication, surveillance, and
traffic management for providers and users of positioning satel-
lites. The International Maritime Organization (IMO) has be-
gun a similar process for ship navigation. 174 International and
national industry standards organizations such as the Interna-
tional Society of Electrical Engineers (ISEE) or in the United
States the RTCA should be involved in creating standards for
safety and interoperability. International as opposed to unilat-
eral standards are crucial, both in terms of capitalizing on effi-
ciency and preventing redundant equipment, as well as ensuring
safety. Even the highly accurate signal provided through dGPS
is of little use if the electronic devices for which it provides an
input do not provide accurate, usable information to the air-
plane pilot or ship captain.
17 Intelsat Agreement, supra note 159, at art. XVIII(c) (providing for arbitra-
tion of disputes).
74 Larsen, supra note 56.
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4. The Peaceful Use of GNSS
The security issues surrounding use of the United States' GPS
system, as well as development of a GNSS based on U.S. military
technology, raise a number of issues for the United States as well
as other nations.
Military control of GPS worries foreign nations who are un-
derstandably reluctant to rely on a signal that the U.S. govern-
ment could simply switch off or seriously degrade during a time
of U.S. military emergency.1 75 Senator Exon believes this is a
red herring, stating:
It is increasingly clear that the selective availability feature built
into the GPS satellites has been rendered all but meaningless by
the march of technology-much of it sponsored and used by
other departments and agencies of the U.S. Government. Vari-
ous differential correction schemes will provide universal access
to extremely precise navigation services within at most a few
years. It is unrealistic to imagine that the Department of Defense
would ever turn off or seriously degrade the GPS signal available
to the public in any but the most grave and dire circumstances
because of the large number of innocent lives that will be de-
pending on GPS at any given moment the world over.' 76
Senator Exon raises the point addressed at the 1994 Space
Law Symposium: Why would the DOD intentionally degrade the
signal but then allow other U.S. agencies to, in effect, negate
this degradation at further taxpayer expense? 7 7 Joseph Canny,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Transportation, generally stated
that DOD representatives were assured that they could meet se-
curity needs. 178 This implies that the military GPS satellites may
have some "bells and whistles" that have not reached the open
press. 179 However, the means by which the DOD could deny the
signal to a particular area or user without degrading other users
is unclear.
'05 See Transportation, Defense Depts. Reach Accord on GPS Use, AVIATION WK. &
SPACE TECH.,Jan. 3, 1994, at 32 (noting that prior to theJanuary 1994 agreement
there was a "growing unease about worldwide aircraft navigation relying on a
system whose accuracy was controlled solely by the U.S. military.").
176 Exon, supra note 54, at 46.
177 Space Law Symposium 1994, supra note 6 (the questions were posed to Joseph
F. Canny, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Transportation, who spoke on GPS
issues).
178 Id. (There was no recording or transcript of this question and answer as Mr.
Canny spoke at the symposium luncheon).
179 This is a hypothesis only.
1995] 283
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AMD COMMERCE
In order to create a GNSS in the near future, reliance on the
United States' GPS will be essential. Even if the U.S. military
retains its own separate and secure GPS system (as was done in
the conversion of the worldwide satellite communications sys-
tem), security concerns remain in that GNSS could be used by
other nations for warlike purposes. One method to deal with
-this problem would be to create a specific provision within the
Convention detailing the peaceful use of the GNSS system. Spe-
cifically, this position would prohibit the use of GNSS for
weapon guidance. Just as the U.S. military used. Inmarsat and
Intelsat systems for communications during Operation Desert
Storm, it is unrealistic to restrict military aircraft and ships from
using GNSS for navigation. However, a weapon guidance system
exclusion, backed by sanctions, such as restrictions on use would
deter those in the arms industry who are already producing or
testing high-tech weaponry utilizing this system. °80 Further,
countries could be threatened with restrictions on purchase of
GNSS related equipment if they develop such weapon guidance
systems. This would at least make difficult the development of a
GNSS guided SCUD missile or similar weapons of mass
destruction.
In summary, the technical and competing issues faced in the
national implementation of civil use of GPS pale when consider-
ing how to turn this national system into an international GNSS.
However, while the technology is new, the processes and histori-
cal precedent for creating an international organization, setting
general guidance principles, and ironing out the details on lia-
bility and technical issues on related equipment are present.
V. CONCLUSION: OPENING THE DOOR
TO THE FUTURE
From Edward Hale's imaginary Brick Moon to the reality of a
constellation of GPS satellites capable of vastly improving the
world's transportation infrastructure, GPS technology has ar-
rived. Voices in Congress, in the executive agencies, and among
180 See Covault, supra note 60, at 103 (discussing a Spanish company's develop-
ment plans for a GPS guided missile); Brad Graham, Missile Project Became a $39
Billion Misfire, WASH. Pos-r, Apr. 3, 1995, at Al, A8 (discussing the failure of a
United States designed missile also using GPS for guidance); William B. Scott,
Tests Show DGPS Imposes Bomb Accuracy, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Aug. 21,
1995, at 69 (detailing tests of DGPS corrected bombs); B-2 Drops First GPS-Aided
Munition, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH.,July 31, 1995 (noting U.S.A.F. testing of
GPS guided bombs).
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the aviation community have recognized the scope of this
revolution. Unfortunately, developing the technology may pale
in comparison to the time and difficulty in integrating GPS into
a global navigation system. Recent initiatives by the U.S. Coast
Guard and FAA to establish augmentation systems and recent
studies on a national architecture provide a step in the right
direction. Further, existing treaties and the U.S. government's
experience with both radionavigation systems and satellite com-
munications may serve as the building blocks for the next step-
the establishment of an international organization or corpora-
tion to oversee a GNSS that will save lives in the air and on the
seas, as well as provide future, unknown benefits to humanity.

